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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
BROWN V. STATE: UNDER THE TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES, A SUSPECT IS IN CUSTODY FOR
MIRANDA PURPOSES WHEN HE IS TRANSPORTED
DIRECTLY FROM A HOSPITAL TO AN INTERROGATION
ROOM.
By: Edward S. Shields III
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a suspect was in a custodial
environment during the six minutes of his interrogation before he was read
his Miranda rights. Brown v. State, 452 Md. 196, 156 A.3d 839 (2017). The
court held that within the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would not have felt free to leave. Id. Lastly, the significant restraint on
Brown's freedom of movement which rose to the level of a formal arrest,
further created a custodial environment. Id. at 219, 156 A.3d at 852.
In October 2014, there was a reported shooting at Elks Lodge. An
anonymous 911 caller reported that he was injured and driving a vehicle to
the Hurlock Village Apartments. An officer responded and observed the
vehicle in question. The officer witnessed Terrance J. Brown ("Brown")
exiting the vehicle. When Brown left the officer's line of vision, the officer
approached the car and noticed dried blood in the passenger area. Brown
was subsequently transported to the hospital. Because of the dried blood,
police towed Brown's vehicle to the station while he was still in the hospital.
They also sent Detective Howard ("Howard") to the hospital to obtain
information from Brown regarding the shooting.
At the hospital, Howard approached Brown with his weapon and badge
clearly visible. Howard told Brown that he was there to "obtain" him. He
further asked Brown to consent to coming back to the station to give a
statement. Brown was placed in the rear passenger seat, without handcuffs,
while wearing hospital scrubs, and a bandage on his head. The marked
police car then transported Brown to the station.
Once they arrived at the station, Brown was brought in through an
entrance not available to the public and led directly to an interrogation room.
A detective interrogated Brown for six minutes before issuing Miranda
warnings. When Brown was being advised of his rights, he asked if he was
under arrest to which the interviewing detective responded in the negative.
After the warnings were issued, Brown repeatedly asked if he could go
home. At the end of the interview Brown was arrested for homicide.
Brown was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related
charges in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. He filed and was
granted a motion to suppress the statements made before he was read his
Miranda rights. The State appealed the circuit court's decision. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the ruling of the circuit court in an
unreported opinion, holding that Brown was not in custody under the totality
34
Brown v. State
of the circumstances. Brown then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
which was granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The issue before the Court of Appeals of Maryland was whether Brown
was in custody for the purposes of Miranda during the entirety of his
interrogation. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 846. A confession is
inadmissible if it was elicited without conforming to Miranda. Brown, 452
Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 846 (citing Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 173-74, 699
A.2d 1170, 1178). The Court in Miranda found that a custodial
interrogation's coercive nature makes it difficult to determine whether
statements are voluntary. Brown, 452 Md. at 210, 156 A.3d at 846 (citing
U.S. v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435, 120 S.Ct. at 2331). Miranda further held
that an individual in custody must be informed of certain rights prior to
interrogation in order to protect his Fifth Amendment rights. Id.
In determining whether an individual is in a custodial environment
requiring the reading of Miranda rights, an objective inquiry is made based
on the totality of the circumstances. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 847
(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128
L.Ed.2d 293). Based on these circumstances, the court must determine
whether there is a restraint on an individual's freedom of movement to a
degree associated with a formal arrest. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at
847 (citing U.S. v. Thompson, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. at 465, 133
L.Ed.2d 383) (1995)). In making this determination, the court will look at
the following factors: when and where the interrogation occurred, whether
the defendant was questioned as a suspect or witness, the length of the
interrogation, the events leading to the interrogation, how the defendant
arrived to be questioned, and subsequent events after the interrogation. Id. at
211, 156 A.3d at 847. Lastly, the court will evaluate whether a reasonable
person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation. Id. at 210,
156 A.3d at 847.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that Brown's freedom of
movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Brown, 452 Md. at 212, 156 A.3d at 848. A reasonable person in Brown's
situation, dressed in a hospital gown, suffering from multiple gunshot
wounds and without access to his vehicle, would have felt unable to leave or
refuse the offer to go to the station. Id. at 213-14, 156 A.3d at 849. The
court further stated that the lower court's factual finding that Brown's
acquiescence to Howard indicated a lack of voluntariness within the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at 213, 156 A.3d at 848. Based on these findings,
the court found that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and
that Brown's degree of movement was restricted, similar to that of a formal
arrest. Id. at 219, 156 A.3d at 852.
The dissenting opinion highlighted certain facts and de-emphasized other
facts. Brown, 452 Md. at 220, 156 A.3d at 852-53. The dissent stated that
the following facts should have been given equal weight as those in the
majority opinion: Brown being told he was going to the station as a victim,
not being handcuffed, repeatedly told he was not under arrest, not being
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restrained at any time before or during the interrogation, the interrogator not
being armed, and his statements being made very early in the interrogation.
Id. at 221, 156 A.3d at 853. Furthermore, the dissent a tacked the majority's
reliance on the circuit court's use of the word "acquiesced" when they
described Brown's response to Howard picking him up from the hospital. Id.
at 224, 156 A.3d at 855. The dissent stated that the majority relied too
heavily on the lower court's use of the term acquiesce, rather than consent,
when describing how Brown was taken to the police station. Id. at 224, 156
A.3d at 855. The dissent also posited that even if Brown felt he was not free
to leave, within the totality of the circumstances, that fact did not show the
restraint on freedom of movement to the degree of a formal arrest. Id. at
225, 156 A.3d at 856.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Brown's freedom of
movement was restricted to the degree of a formal arrest and that Brown's
interrogation was custodial for Miranda purposes. This ruling strengthens the
rights of defendants by only allowing legally obtained voluntary statements
to be used against them. This holding further emphasizes how important it is
for police to read a suspect their Miranda rights before interrogation begins.
The state should stress to police the importance of handling interrogations
with care because the state could lose inculpatory evidence based on police
failing to "Mirandize" a suspect. By broadening the definition of custodial
interrogation, police may have a harder time following the guidelines set
forth in this case. Police often use certain interrogation techniques to quickly
obtain information, and this ruling could make it more difficult for police to
gather necessary information to solve cases.
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